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NECESSITY, POSSIBILITY, AND THE
STONE WHICH CANNOT BE MOVED
George I. Mavrodes
The recent opening up of communications with the planet Jupiter has given
earth-bound philosophers an exciting opportunity to see how philosophy looks
from the other side of the solar system, so to speak. Of course, many of us have
hardly gone so far as to look at philosophy from the other side of our own
planet-in Buddhist philosophy, for example. Still, there may be something
useful in seeing some old problems treated in a new key.
Philosophy has had a long tradition on Jupiter, much longer than on Earth.
But-maybe because of the massive gravitational field of that gigantic planetthings seem to go much more slowly there, and it's not all that much further
ahead. Jovian philosophical developments over the past 1,000 earth-years, for
example, are commonly referred to as "contemporary philosophy."
Much Jovian philosophy seems to have grown out of reflection on pre-philosophical modes of life and thought, just as terrestrial philosophy of religion, for
example, grows out of reflection on religious practice and belief. There may
well be a rich and profound Jovian religious life, but I think we have not yet
learned of it. The widespread Jovian practice of admiration, for example, strikes
me as proto-religious, or post-religious, or perhaps para-religious, but not really
and fully religious. Nevertheless, it has given rise to interesting speculation.
One of the more widespread Jovian "cults" of admiration is that of lithomiration, the admiration of stones. There are a lot of stones on Jupiter, and ceremonies
of lithomiration can be, and are, conducted almost everywhere. But the planetary
center of lithomiration is in the Hamartic valley, just north of the equator. In
the middle of that valley there rises an enormous granite monolith-The Stoneestimated to be over 1,000 times the volume of the Yosemite Valley's famed
EI Capitan. The high point of the lithomiric year comes at dawn of the summer
solstice when the first rays of light catch the topmost crags of The Stone and
tens of thousands of admirers rise ponderously with a mighty shout. Most
lithomiricists hope to visit the Hamartic valley for this ceremony at least once
in their lives.
Just what do lithomiricists admire? The least sophisticated admirers seem to
direct their attention and interest straight-forwardly to The Stone, which they
sometimes also call "Lithos." More sophisticated admirers smile tolerantly about
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this, and say that the real object of admiration is not that huge granite block in
the Hamartic valley, a stone which is no doubt slowly eroding in the harsh Jovian
sandstorms. It is rather something which The Stone symbolizes, the transcendent
stone which lies behind or beyond all planetary stones, and from which all
stoniness derives. That, they say, is the true and everlasting stone, which is
worthy of admiration. And it is that true and transcendent stone which is the
real object wherever there is genuine admiration, and this is the object for which
the high and noble name "Lithos" should be reserved.
(Some of these sophisticated lithomiricists cannot refrain from trying to explain
just where Lithos is located. So they say (severally) that it is nowhere, or
everywhere, or perhaps both. This has given rise to many puzzles.)
There is also a long tradition of lithology, even longer than that of philosophy.
Lithologians have given much time and effort to identifying and explaining the
stone-like attributes of Lithos. (Some of them, however, say that Lithos does
not have so much as a single property in common with planetary stones, even
The Stone. At most, they say, some of Lithos' properties are merely analogous
to the properties of stones. This, too, has given rise to puzzles.)
One of Lithos' most interesting attributes appears in the basic lithomiric literature, and other pre-philosophical texts, as the property of stability. Here the
accounts are fairly straightforward. Lithos is solid, weighty, well-settled. It stays
in its place. It is not blown about by the wind. Excavators do not topple it.
Jupiter-quakes do not displace it, and even the collisions of stars do not shake it.
Over many thousands of years, however, this property has been refined and
polished philosophically. An important move, early on, largely replaced the
categorical notion of stability with its modalized analogue, immobility. Not
merely is Lithos unmoved, etc. Now it is said that it cannot be moved, it is not
possible to move it. The doctrine has thus expanded to cover not only what is
but also what could be.
A second crucial step was taken in the great Middle Period of Jovian philosophy,
six or seven thousand years ago. An extremely influential philosophicallithologian proposed that the doctrine of lithic immobility should be understood to say
that Lithos remained unmoved in all circumstances, either actual or possible, in
which it was logically possible to remain unmoved. On the surface, at least, this
move seemed to contract the scope of the doctrine. It seemed to suggest that
perhaps Lithos could be moved after all, if the circumstances made stability
logically impossible. The distinguished lithologian, however, hotly rejected this
charge of watering down the doctrine of immobility. Logical absurdity, he said,
was in no way a type of stability. If anything, it expresses a radical instability,
unworthy of admiration. It is therefore completely inappropriate to something
like Lithos. It would be unreasonable, he said, to demand that the doctrine of
lithic immobility (or any other lithological doctrine) should be interpreted so as
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to make Lithos either be or do a logical impossibility.
This proposal has dominated speculation about lithic immobility right down
to the present. There have, however, been a few distinguished dissidents. They
have said that those who really admired Ethos and took seriously the idea of
immobility would ascribe to Lithos the deepest and most radical form of that
property. That would be a stability which would be victorious not only over
every force, actual and possible, but over logic itself. Lithos stands firm, they
said, even if it is logically impossible to remain unmoved. For Lithos also
transcends logic.
This is, of course, a dark doctrine, and it has attracted few defenders. I will
mention it only once more, and briefly.
There has been a recent spate of renewed Jovian interest in speculation about
immobility. In these discussions several Jovian philosophers have used, simply
as a heuristic strategy, the assumption that there is, or may be, another being
which they call "0." And O's most relevant property is that of omnimotility,
the power of moving anything. One can then ask whether it is possible that botl!
Lithos and 0 exist, what happens when omnimotility collides with immobility,
and so on. And these speculations are used to explore the logical features of the
concept of lithic immobility.
Although omnimotility was originally explained simply as the power of moving
anything, it was quickly realized that an explicitly modalized version was more
interesting. So now this is generally understood as the power to move any possible
object. Omnimotility, like immobility, covers not only what is but also what
could be.
Some of the recent discussions make use also of a new way of talking about
possibility and actuality, a terminology which has become popular among Jovian
philosophers in the last two or three hundred earth-years. Complete states of
affairs which are logically possible are spoken of as "possible jupiters." That
state of affairs which actually obtains is, of course, the actual jupiter. The claim
that something possibly exists can be put by saying that it exists in some possible
jupiter. If it actually exists, it exists in the actual jupiter. That two things are
compossible becomes the claim that there is some possible jupiter in which both
of them exist. And (in the way in which I use it here) the claim that two properties
are compos sible is the claim that there is some possible jupiter in which they
are both exemplified (not necessarily by the same thing).
U sing both the older and the newer terminology, we can summarize the most
interesting options which have been explored. Many lithologians hold that Lithos
has necessary existence, i.e., that it exists in every possible jupiter. Others,
slightly more cautious, say that if Lithos exists at all then it has necessary
existence, i.e., that if it exists in any possible jupiter then it exists in every
possible jupiter. And this presumably means that if Lithos is possible, then it is
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actual. Some, however, hold a third opinion, and that is that Lithos is a contingent
object, one which exists in some possible jupiters, but not in all.
With respect to the property of immobility, some hold that this is an essential
property of Lithos, i.e., a property which Lithos could not possibly lack. In the
language of possible jupiters, Lithos is immobile in every possible jupiter in
which it exists. Others, however, maintain that immobility is an accidental
property of Lithos, one whose lack would not be fatal to the existence or identity
of Lithos. There would thus be some possible jupiters in which Lithos exists but
is not immobile.
Since 0 is primarily a heuristic device in these discussions, a stipulated and
hypothetical entity, it would seem that it could also be thought of (or specified)
in any of these ways. Abstractly, then, there are quite a few combinations to be
considered.
Many of these, however, seem to yield the same result, so the number can
be quickly reduced. It has seemed obvious to many Jovian philosophers, for
example, that omnimotility and immobility are not compossible. There is no
possible jupiter in which there exists both an immobile object and an omnimotile
agent. For either immobility would triumph, and therefore omnimotility would
perish, or vice versa. If Lithos has necessary existence, therefore, and has
immobility as an essential property, then it excludes an omnimotile agent from
every possible jupiter. In that case, 0 exists in a possible jupiter (i.e., is a
possible existent) only if omnimotility is not essential to O.
If on the other hand, Lithos is an impossible entity, then there is no possible
jupiter in which there is an immobile object. (This assumes that Lithos is the
only candidate for immobility.) There would be then no apparent barrier to the
existence of O. In that case, 0 is a possible existent.
If Lithos is contingent, or an entity for which immobility is accidental, then
there are possible jupiters in which an immobile object exists and others in which
there is no such object. If 0 is contingent, or if omnimotility is not essential to
0, then 0 can be fitted into some jupiter in which it will not collide with Lithos.
So 0 is possible.
But if 0 is an entity which exists in every jupiter if it exists in any (i.e., 0
necessarily exists if it is possible), and if omnimotility is essential to it, then it
seems to collide logically with even a contingent Lithos. If it is even possible
that Lithos exists and is immobile, then 0 is impossible.
These arguments have seemed fairly convincing to many, but they are far
from being universally accepted. A few-those who hold that Lithos transcends
logic-say that, for all we know, both Lithos and 0 may be actualities, along
with their interesting properties. Though. they have properties which are not
logically compossible, they may nevertheless both exist, because logical impossibility is not a barrier to Lithos. But, as I have said, this is a dark doctrine. I
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can say no more about it here.
Others, however, have challenged the claim that immobility and omnimotility
are logically incompossible. Relying on the interpretation which has come down
from the Middle Period, they observe that immobility extends only to what is
logically possible. But it is not logically possible for a thing to remain unmoved
if it is subjected to a power which is sufficient for moving anything. Since 0,
by stipulation, has the power of omnimotility, if 0 exists then absolute stability
is not logically possible. If 0 exists, then, Lithos will indeed be movable by o.
But because of the rider referring to what is logically possible, that fact will not
in any way damage Lithos' immobility. And, of course, Lithos will continue to
be unmoved by tornadoes, jupiter-quakes, and so on. No reasonable philosopher,
it is said, could expect more from the concept of immobility.
In any possible jupiter, then, in which Lithos exists and 0 does not, Lithos
is absolutely unmoved. In those jupiters in which both 0 and Lithos exist, Lithos
may be moved, but only by O. Thus, one might say, the burden of adjusting to
the friction between immobility and omnimotility falls on Lithos.
There have recently been a few Jovian philosophers who have been asking
why the burden should be assumed to fall in that way. Why, they ask, should
we not apply the same level of sophistication to the concept of omnimotility?
Why, that is, should we not construe this property as the power of moving
anything which it is logically possible to move? Construed in this way, it does
not require that a being which possesses it be able to perform the logically absurd
task of moving something which cannot possibly be moved. On this interpretation,
o would indeed be incapable of moving Lithos, since Lithos is immobile, but
this would be no damage to the omnimotility of o.
In other words, we could say that in those possible jupiters in which 0 exists,
and· Uthos does not, everything is movable by O. In those jupiters, however,
in which they both exist Lithos remains unmoved by O. But no reasonable
philosopher could demand that 0, in order to have the power of omnimotility,
should be able to move everything even in those possible jupiters in which there
exist things which cannot possibly be moved. On this interpretation, then, the
burden of adjusting to the friction between immobility and omnimotility falls on
o rather than on Lithos.
In part, the difference between this approach and the previous one seems to
be one of where one adopts a "sophisticated" analysis of a radical property.
Notions like immobility and omnimotility initially invite interpretation simply
in terms of everything, nothing, etc. Then one thinks of adding to one of these
the rider, which is logically possible. Thus we get what might be called a
"qualified" version of the property. If one of these concepts is understood in
this sophisticated way, while the other remains in its cruder (and original) form,
then it is the sophisticated concept which gives way before the cruder one.
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If both concepts are construed in the sophisticated way, however, we seem
to fall into a peculiar impasse. If attaching the possibility rider to one property
makes them compossible, then it certainly seems that they should be compossible
if they both carry that rider. But in this case there seems to be nothing to indicate
which is the property which "gives way," the one which bears the burden of
adjusting to the other. And yet, we think, there must be some answer to that
question. There must be some fact of the matter.
For suppose that both 0 and Lithos exist in the actual jupiter. And suppose,
too, that the concepts of immobility and omnimotility are both restricted to what
is logically possible. What actually happens, then? Does Lithos remain unmoved,
even in the face of O's power? Perhaps so, since that apparently would do no
damage to O's omnimotility. Or is it, on the other hand, that 0 moves everything,
despite Lithos' immobility? That would not damage Lithos' immobility, so it
too seems an option. But which one actually happens? It seems as though one
of these must happen, and they cannot both happen. The crucial properties
themselves do not seem to determine which one happens. But if these properties
do not determine what happens, then what on jupiter does?
One Jovian philosopher has recently claimed that the plausible sounding
assumption which we made above is mistaken. He argues that if both properties
are unqualified, then they are incompossible. If one-it does not matter which
one-is qualified, then they are compossible. But, curiously, if both are qualified,
then they are again incompossible. For, he says, assume (per impossible) that
both Lithos and 0 exist in the actual jupiter, both with their interesting qualified
properties. Now, either it is logically possible for Lithos to remain unmoved in
the face of O's power, or it is not possible. And, if it is possible, then Lithos
must remain unmoved, or else it cannot have even the qualified version of
immobility.
But, he argues, immobility and omnimotility are qualified in exactly the same
way. There must, therefore, be a strict logical parity between them. And so, if
it is possible for Lithos to remain absolutely unmoved in the face of O's power
it must also be possible for 0 to move absolutely everything, in the face of
Lithos' stability. But then 0 must move everything, to retain even the qualified
version of ornnimotility.
Beginning then with the qualified properties, plus the assumption that it is
possible for Lithos to remain unmoved, we conclude that Lithos remains absolutely unmoved and that 0 moves absolutely everything. But that is a reductio.
If we begin with the other assumption, that it is not possible for Lithos to
remain unmoved, the parity principle yields the conclusion that it is not possible
for 0 to move everything. But there is no candidate for complete stability other
than Lithos, and no candidate for the mover of Lithos other than o. So again
we seem to have a reductio. And so this philosopher concludes that the qualified
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versions of these properties are logically imcompossible.
This puzzling line of argument seems to be related to the earlier problem of
determining which property gives way when both of them are qualified. The
conclusion of the argument strikes many Jovians as counter-intuitive, and they
are inclined to regard it as sophistical. But no clear and persuasive refutation of
it has yet emerged.
This rather unsatisfactory position seems to represent the state of the question
at the present time. A few Jovians have recently been suggesting, with some
hesitation, that perhaps the trouble is that the notion of logical possibility is not
as clear as it has seemed. They are becoming suspicious of what might be called
"free floating possibilities," possibilities which seem to be independent of any
concrete realities. Instead, they say, it may be that possibilities must in some
way grow out of actualities, so that what is has a logical priority, or some sort
of priority, over what could be. If that is so, then there might be a metaphysical,
rather than a logical, solution of the difficulty. If, that is, 0 were metaphysically
"deeper" in the structure of reality than Lithos, then it is Lithos that would give
way. If Lithos were deeper, then 0 would bear the burden of adjusting. But this
theory has not been worked out in convincing detail. It is mostly a step yet to
be taken in Jovian philosophy.
The University of Michigan

